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EVIDENCE -ATIORNEY-CLIBNT PRIVILEGE - IDENTITY OF CLIBNT HELD 
PRMLEGEn-Petitioner attorney was retained by an organization of fruit 
merchants to investigate parking conditions on the New York piers which 
prevented its members from attending the daily fruit auctions, and to 
take steps to remedy this situation. During his investigations petitioner 
learned from one of his employers that two local politicians were being 
paid to allow certain large trailer trucks to continue parking illegally on 
the piers. The attorney reported this information to city officials. He was 
subsequently subpoenaed to testify on the matter before respondent, New 
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York City Commissioner of Investigation, who was conducting an inquiry 
into waterfront conditions. At the hearing, petitioner refused to identify 
the persons who had retained him.1 On appeal from affirmance of an 
order for his arrest for contempt,2 held, reversed. Since the communication 
had been made in aid of a public purpose and had been disclosed to the 
public authorities, and since the existence of an actual attorney-client rela-
tionship had been otherwise established, the privilege should extend to 
cover the client's identity. In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 
N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960). 
The attorney-client privilege generally protects from disclosure those 
communications made by the client to the attorney while the latter is 
acting in his professional capacity where the client is seeking legal advice of 
any kind and when the communication is necessary to that purpose and 
made in confidence.3 The privilege rests upon the desirability of encourag-
ing full and open disclosure by the client.4 Since its invocation results in 
the suppression of otherwise competent evidence, however, the privilege is 
strictly construed.rs 
Generally, the identity of the client has been held to be outside the 
scope of the privilege.6 Two reasons have been advanced for this position. 
First, it is said that every party to litigation has a right to know the identity 
of his adversary.7 This principle has been said to apply although no litiga-
tion is pending if the attorney performs acts during his employment which 
affect the rights of third parties.s The second reason, and the one most 
often invoked, is that before any privilege can be recognized, the relation-
ship which gives rise to that privilege must first be proved, and that this 
1 Petitioner relied on N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Am: § 353 which provides, "An attorney or 
counselor at law shall not disclose or be allowed to disclose a communication made by 
his client to him, or his advice given thereon, in the course of his professional employ-
ment .••. " 
2In re Blumenfeld, 22 Misc. 2d 839, 200 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 10 App. Div. 
2d 909, 202 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1960). 
3 See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-329 (3d ed. 1940); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 
§§ 91-100 (1954). 
4 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d ed. 1940). 
5 Id. § 2291, at 557-58. 
6 Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 
778 (2d Cir. 1944); Mauch v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940); Magida v. 
Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); In re Richardson, 157 A.2d 695, 31 
N.J. 391 (1960). Terms of the fee arrangement may also be outside the privilege. Basker-
ville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762, 764 (1956). See generally 8 WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE§ 2313 (3d ed. 1940). 
7 Mauch v. Commissioner, supra note 6, at 556; Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 
235-36, 149 Pac. 566, 568 (1915); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2313, at 608 (3d ed. 1940). 
8 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 94 (1954). But see In re Shawmut Mining Co., 94 App. 
Div. 156, 87 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1904), in which the privilege was said to apply although 
an attorney negotiated the purchase of certain mining property for his client, thereby 
"affecting the rights" of certain customers of the purchased corporation. Cf. Neugass v. 
Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699, 249 N.Y. Supp. 631 (Sup. Ct. 1931), in which the 
court indicates that this principle may apply only when the attorney is himself attempting 
to use the courts to benefit his client. 
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necessarily involves revelation of the client's identity.9 Although originally 
advanced on purely logical grounds, this latter explanation seems to have 
been retained primarily as a means of dealing with possible attempts of 
attorney-witnesses to evade all questioning by invoking the privilege of an 
alleged client who in fact does not exist.10 Resort to it has also been made, 
however, in cases in which the existence of an actual client is unquestioned, 
but where other evidence indicates that the privilege is being claimed for 
the purpose of hiding questionable dealings of the attorney, the client, or 
both. Professor McCormick has, in fact, remarked, "One who reviews the 
cases in this area will be struck with the prevailing flavor of chicanery and 
sharp practice pervading most of the attempts to suppress proof of pro-
fessional employment .... "11 These cases thus present strong policy reasons 
for full disclosure, in order that the law will not provide a cloak for illicit 
activity.12 In this more modern context, the courts have continued to ad-
vance the argument that before the privilege will arise the client's identity 
must be disclosed to establish the existence of an attorney-client relation-
ship. The logical appeal of this argument is such that the courts have 
tended to invoke it as the sole basis for decision in cases where the privilege 
is claimed.13 The few exceptional cases seem to involve circumstances in 
which disclosure would visit particularly severe injury upon the client.14 
The decision in the principal case stands squarely against this trend to-
ward inflexible application of the rule that the identity of the client is 
never within the privilege. Its result is especially significant in light of the 
prior New York decision in People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County 
Jail,rn which had appeared to commit the jurisdiction to the position that 
o Behrens v. Hironimus, supra note 6; Goddard v. United States, 131 F.2d 220 (5th 
Cir. 1942); Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass. 1958); United States v. Lee, 107 
Fed. 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1901). 
10 E.g., United States v. Lee, supra note 9. 
11 McCoR!IIICK, EvroENCE § 94 at 190 (1954). 
12 "Disclosure should be made if we are to maintain confidence in the bar and in the 
administration of justice." People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 
714, 270 N.Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1934). 
13 Behrens v. Hironimus, supra note 6; Gretsky v. Miller, supra note 9; Magida v. 
Continental Can Co., supra note 6; People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 
supra note 12. 
H E.g., Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (II Wheat.) 280 (1826) (disclosure would have 
revealed the particular purpose for which the attorney was employed); Ex parte Mc-
Donough, supra note 7 (disclosure would have implicated attorney's known clients with 
other individuals who had been indicted in an election fraud case, and thus would have 
operated indirectly as an admission of guilt); Elliott v. United States, 23 App. D.C. 456 
(D.C. Cir. 1904) (disclosure would have violated an express pledge by the attorney that he 
would not reveal that a certain client had made a will); In re Shawmut Mining Co., supra 
note 8 (disclosure would have linked the client with a transaction which might have 
become the basis of a civil suit against him). 
15150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y. 
Supp. 1059 (1934). This case involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to secure 
the release of an attorney arrested for contempt for refusing to reveal to a grand jury 
the identity of persons who had retained him to represent 15 individuals who had been 
arrested on lottery and gambling charges. The court, in denying the petition, said that 
the attorney must name an actual client in order to prove the existence of the relation-
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the client's identity is never privileged. The court did not overrule Vogel-
stein, but rather distinguished it by pointing out that the existence of the 
attorney-client relationship in the principal case was not questioned, and 
that disclosure was therefore not essential to activate the privilege.16 It 
should be clear, however, that while the court refused to adhere to an in-
flexible rule of disclosure, its decision does not establish the converse proposi-
tion that identity of the client ought always to be privileged. The facts of 
the principal case presented policy considerations in the opposite extreme 
from the "undercurrent of chicanery" which had previously led some courts 
to require disclosure. Here the client's communication had been made to 
expose wrongdoing, and with intent that the information be transmitted to 
public authorities. This had been done, and the public interest had been 
served; to disclose the client's name would merely have left him vulnerable 
to reprisals from the persons whose illegal activities he had exposed. It 
therefore seems that the presence of equally compelling policy considera-
tions will be required before the court will again extend the privilege to 
include the identity of the client. Absent these considerations, cases in this 
area will merit substantially the same treatment they have received in 
the past. The principal case merely retains for the courts a discretion to 
extend the attorney-client privilege to those situations where the interests 
of justice so demand.17 
Michael M. Hughes 
1 Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 
(1958). The power to regulate advertising practices is derived from that part of the 
FTCA which directs the FTC to prevent persons subject to the act from using "unfair 
methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 
